Summary. The paper addresses a formal de®nition of a confounder based on the qualitative de®nition that is commonly used in standard epidemiology text-books. To derive the criterion for a factor to be a confounder given by Miettinen and Cook and to clarify inconsistency between various criteria for a confounder, we introduce the concepts of an irrelevant factor, an occasional confounder and a uniformly irrelevant factor. We discuss criteria for checking these and show that Miettinen and Cook's criterion can also be applied to occasional confounders. Moreover, we consider situations with multiple potential confounders, and we obtain two necessary conditions that are satis®ed by each confounder set. None of the de®nitions and results presented in this paper require the ignorability and suf®cient control confounding assumptions which are commonly employed in observational and epidemiological studies.
Introduction
The concepts of confounders and confounding are of great importance in epidemiology (Kleinbaum et al., 1982; Rothman, 1986; . In the presence of confounding, the eect of exposure on the rate of a disease cannot be assessed correctly. Criteria for assessing a confounder and confounding still appear to be inconsistent in the epidemiological literature (Boivin and Wacholder, 1985; Grayson, 1987; Greenland et al., 1989; Weinberg, 1993; . According to Greenland and Robins (1986) , there are basically two main approaches for assessing confounding and a confounder. One approach, called`collapsibility based', considers confounding as arising from dierences between strati®ed measures of association and the corresponding crude measure. The collapsibility-based approach has a criterion for a confounder based on the collapsibility of a particular parameter of association (Breslow and Day, 1980; Kleinbaum et al., 1982) . This approach depends on both the parameter of interest and the categorization of the factor to be collapsed over. For the use of a collapsibility criterion in the analysis of contingency tables and statistical modelling, see for example Whittemore (1978) , Ducharme and LePage (1986) , Geng (1992) and Guo and Geng (1995) . The other approach, called`comparability based', considers confounding as arising from the exposed and unexposed populations which are not comparable. We say that the unexposed population is comparable with the exposed population if the proportion of diseased individuals in the unexposed population equals the hypothetical proportion of diseased individuals in the exposed population without exposure. The comparability-based approach determines a factor to be a confounder if adjusting for it reduces confounding (Greenland and Robins, 1986; . The comparability-based approach has the following criterion for a confounder which was obtained inductively by Miettinen and Cook (1981) (see also Greenland and Robins (1986) ):
(a) it must be predictive of risk in the unexposed population and (b) it must have dierent distributions between the exposed and unexposed populations. Greenland and Robins (1986) illustrated that this criterion is not sucient for a confounder. described a causal diagram approach for detecting multiple confounders under the assumption that the causal diagram is completely constructed on the basis of knowledge beyond the empirical data and that it includes a sucient set of potential confounders. The causal diagram approach presented by Spirtes et al. (1993) and Pearl (1995) was originally intended for assessing a causal eect of an external intervention on the whole population, including both exposed and unexposed individuals. As many researchers have mentioned (Miettinen and Cook, 1981; Greenland and Robins, 1986; Wickramaratne and Holford, 1987; Holland, 1989) , epidemiological studies are more concerned with causal eects of exposure in the exposed population. Thus, in such an epidemiological study, we construct a control group which would be comparable with the exposed population if the exposure were absent in that population.
In this paper, we give a formal de®nition of a confounder according to the standard epidemiological de®nition of a confounder presented by Miettinen and Cook (1981) , Kleinbaum et al. (1982) , Greenland and Robins (1986) and . This de®nition does not require the assumption that a known set of potential confounders is sucient for the control of confounding. We ®rst focus on the situations with a single potential confounder and show that Miettinen and Cook's criterion for a confounder does not require any untestable assumptions. Then we illustrate inconsistency between Miettinen and Cook's criterion and the criterion based on the collapsibility of dierences in risk or relative risks. To clear up this inconsistency, we introduce the concepts of an occasional confounder and uniformly irrelevant factor. Finally we extend these results to situations with multiple potential confounders.
In Section 2, we formalize the de®nitions of a confounder and an irrelevant factor on the basis of the counterfactual model presented by Rubin (1974) and Holland (1986) . Section 3 gives the necessary and sucient condition for a uniformly irrelevant factor and shows that Miettinen and Cook's criterion is a necessary condition for an occasional confounder. In Section 4 we discuss how Miettinen and Cook's criterion can be applied to situations with multiple potential confounders. A few concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
Confounder and irrelevant factor
We follow the notation of Holland (1989) . Let E be an exposure with values e and " e representing its presence or absence respectively, and let D e and D " e be the corresponding responses, which take values 1 or 0 denoting the presence or absence of a disease.
Epidemiological studies focus on the eects of exposure on the rate of a disease in the exposed population. Let P(D e 1|E e) and P(D " e 1|E " e) be the proportions of diseased individuals in the exposed population and the unexposed or control population, and let P(D " e 1|E e) be the hypothetical proportion of individuals in the exposed population who would have developed the disease even if they had not been exposed. Since P(D " e 1|E e) is a hypothetical proportion, the model is a counterfactual model (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986) .
As mentioned in Greenland and Robins (1986) , confounding arises from inherent dierences in risk between the exposed and unexposed populations. The term`inherent dierences' here means dierences that would exist even if exposure were entirely absent from both populations. Confounding bias B is de®ned as the dierence between the hypothetical proportion of diseased individuals in the exposed population without exposure and the proportion of diseased individuals in the unexposed population (Wickramaratne and Holford, 1987; Holland, 1989) , i.e.
B P (D "
e 1jE e) À P (D " e 1jE " e)X If B 0, then the exposed and unexposed populations are comparable and there is no confounding (Wickramaratne and Holford, 1987) . However, we cannot guarantee B 0 for an observational study. In this case, we try to adjust for some factors to estimate the hypothetical proportion. Let C be a factor with possible values 1, F F F , K; assume that C is not an intervening variable in a causal pathway from exposure to disease, i.e. C is a covariate. Let D {1, F F F , K}, and let the subpopulations be de®ned by k P D. Assume that P(E, C) > 0 for all possible values of E and C. De®ne P(D " e 1|E " e, C k) to be the proportion of diseased individuals in the unexposed subpopulation of C k, and P(D " e 1|E e, C k) the hypothetical proportion of diseased individuals in the exposed subpopulation C k if exposure were entirely absent. Confounding bias in the subpopulation C k is de®ned as
When there is no confounding in any subpopulation, then B k 0 for all k, and it means that each unexposed subpopulation is comparable with the corresponding exposed subpopulation. This situation is called subpopulation comparable, also called sucient control confounding in . Subpopulation comparability is equivalent to the case when D " e is independent of E given C, denoted by D " e c c EjC in the notation of Dawid (1979) . It is related to the weak and strong ignorability assumptions de®ned by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . Weak ignorability is de®ned as D " e c c EjC and D e c c EjC, and strong ignorability is de®ned as (D " e , D e ) c c EjC. Thus strong ignorability implies weak ignorability, which in turn implies subpopulation comparability. None of these can be veri®ed from empirical data (Rubin, 1974; Greenland, 1989; Holland, 1986 Holland, , 1989 .
De®nitions
The common de®nition of a confounder is that it is a risk factor for the disease, control of which can reduce bias for estimating causal eects (see Miettinen and Cook (1981) , Kleinbaum et al. (1982) , page 244, and Greenland and Robins (1986) ). Here`control' means adjustment at the analysis stage or strati®cation at the design stage of a study.
We now formalize the common de®nition of confounders. According to the common standardization in epidemiology (Miettinen, 1972; Kleinbaum et al., 1982; Rothman, 1986) , the standardized proportion P D (D " e 1jE " e) obtained by adjusting the distribution of C in the unexposed population to that in the exposed population is
This de®nition states that the standardized proportion P D (D " e 1|E " e) obtained by adjusting for the confounder C is closer to the hypothetical proportion P(D " e 1|E e) than is the crude proportion P(D " e 1|E " e). It does not need the subpopulation comparable assumption. Like Miettinen and Cook's (1981) criterion, this de®nition considers a single potential confounder or a composite confounder consisting of several potential confounders. Situations with multiple potential confounders are discussed in Section 4. As a referee has noted, under this de®nition it is possible that C 1 is a confounder, C 2 is a confounder but {C 1 , C 2 } is not a confounder. To avoid this counter-intuitive property, we present the concept of an occasional confounder in the next section. Note that confounding bias may not be completely eliminated by controlling a confounder, whereas there may be an unbiased estimator without controlling for the confounder. It requires an untestable assumption (such as a causal diagram or a sucient set of potential confounders) to determinate an unbiased estimator.
To study the concept of a confounder analytically, the idea of an irrelevant factor is also required.
De®nition 2. A covariate C is an irrelevant factor if
Since the estimate of the hypothetical proportion remains unchanged after adjusting for an irrelevant factor, we do not need to adjust for it to reduce confounding. A factor may be neither a confounder nor an irrelevant factor, and such factors should not be controlled for since confounding will be increased by controlling for it; an example was given in Greenland and Robins (1986) . Robins and Morgenstern (1987) , page 873, considered an alternative approach which de®nes a factor to be a confounder if it is not an irrelevant factor.
Criteria
Let C c c E denote independence of C and E, and D " e c c CjE " e denote conditional independence of D " e and C given E " e.
Proof. Suppose that C c c E or D " e c c CjE " e holds. We can obtain immediately that C is an irrelevant factor and thus not a confounder.
( Proposition 1 veri®es the criterion for a confounder obtained inductively by Miettinen and Cook (1981) , with the following qualitative meanings.
(a) D " e T c c CjE " e: C is predictive of risk in the unexposed population. (b) C T c c E: C has dierent distributions in the exposed and unexposed populations. Wickramaratne and Holford (1987) stated that the conditions C c c E or D " e c c CjE " e, which are the converse of Miettinen and Cook's criterion for a confounder, are sucient for non-confounding under the subpopulation comparable assumption. Robins (1989) showed, without this assumption, that the conditions C c c E or D " e c c CjE " e are sucient for the equality of the standardized risk dierence and the crude risk dierence.
Occasional confounder and uniformly irrelevant factor
The above de®nitions of a confounder and an irrelevant factor depend on the choice of categorization (i.e. level or scale) for the factor under consideration. For example, age may be a confounder or an irrelevant factor when it is categorized by every 10 years of age, but it may not be a confounder when categorized by every 20 years. Such a phenomenon is illustrated in the example given in Section 3.1. When there is confounding in subpopulations induced by a potential confounder, we can see from this example that non-collapsibility of risk dierences is neither equivalent to Miettinen and Cook's (1981) criterion nor a necessary condition of a confounder, whereas Miettinen and Cook's criterion is still necessary not only for a confounder as shown in Section 2.2 but also for an occasional confounder, to be shown in this section.
An example
Let a factor C indicate groups categorized by every 10 years of age, and its values 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote the original age groups 20±29, 30±39, 40±49 and 50±59 years respectively. Using the individual eect model presented by Greenland and Robins (1986) , we can classify all individuals into the following four types: e 0. Suppose that there is no exposure eect, i.e. there are only individuals of types 1 and 4, and that the joint distribution of disease, exposure and a factor C is given in Table 1 . Since B 156/300 ) 174/300 )0.06, there is confounding. Since P(D " e 1|E " e) 0X58 P D (D " e 1|E " e), C is an irrelevant factor and bias cannot be reduced by adjusting the distribution of C.
When the individuals are regrouped by every 20 years, we obtain a coarse subpopulation as given in Table 2 . For the regrouping denoted by p {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, the standardized In this case of no exposure eect, we also ®nd that P(D " e 1|E e) P(D e 1|E e) 0.52. Since |P(D " e 1|E e) ) P p (D " e 1|E " e)| 0 is less than |B| 0.06, we ®nd that C is a confounder with respect to the categorization of every 20 years. Confounding can be corrected since P(D "
e 1|E e) P p (D " e 1|E " e). It can be seen from this example that there are some situations in which confounding can be reduced by recategorizing a potential confounder, although we cannot recognize these situations from observed data. However, this example by no means suggests that we should try to merge the levels of a factor to correct confounding. It should be noted that the risk dierences in Table 1 are collapsible over groups of 10 years but Miettinen and Cook's (1981) criterion is satis®ed. Thus these collapsibility-and comparability-based approaches are inconsistent for detecting whether C is a confounder. We can eliminate this inconsistency by introducing the concepts of an occasional confounder and uniformly irrelevant factor. This example is mainly used to illustrate the fact that a factor may be detected as a confounder in one study but not in another owing to using measurements on dierent scales. Even in the same study, dierent people may reach dierent conclusions for detecting a confounder when they use dierent categorizations. Such a factor should be looked at more carefully. We should further consider confounders from the general principle as in Miettinen and Cook (1981) : the criterion for detecting a confounder should depend on neither the measure of association chosen nor the categorization taken.
De®nitions
Let x be a non-empty subset of values of C, i.e. x D and x T [, where D is the ®nest original categorization of C. A coarse subpopulation of x consists of all subpopulations of C k for all k P x. Confounding bias in a coarse subpopulation of x is de®ned as
e 1jE e, C P x) À P (D " e 1jE " e, C P x)X Let p {x 1 , F F F , x s } for s P 2 be a partition of D {1, F F F , K}, a class of non-empty subsets of D such that Table 2 . Distribution with C being a confounder with respect to partition p = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}
Type Distribution for the following values of C: 
The standardized P p (D " e 1|E " e) based on p is
e, C P x) P (C P xjE e)X De®nition 3. A covariate C is called an occasional confounder if there is a partition p such that
If C is an occasional confounder, there is a partition such that confounding can be reduced or eliminated by controlling for C with respect to the partition p, but such a partition cannot be recognized from the observed data. If C is not an occasional confounder, then confounding cannot be reduced by controlling for C, no matter what categorization is chosen for C, or no matter how the subpopulations are grouped. Thus it is unnecessary to consider how to control for a factor which is not an occasional confounder. If C is an occasional confounder, then any set containing C is also an occasional confounder. Any confounder is also an occasional confounder, but the reverse is not true.
De®nition 4.
A factor C is a uniformly irrelevant factor if, for any possible partition p,
Hence adjusting for a uniformly irrelevant factor C does not reduce or enhance confounding under any categorization. A uniformly irrelevant factor is not an occasional confounder and thus is not a confounder.
Criterion
Researchers clearly take the concept of a uniformly irrelevant factor as the criterion for screening out a confounder, but in practice they detect a confounder only under a special categorization of a factor. The original idea of Miettinen and Cook's (1981) criterion does not restrict a confounder to a particular categorization, and the criterion essentially aims at the occasional confounder. If a factor C satis®es (a) or (b) in theorem 1, controlling for it does not reduce confounding no matter how C is categorized, and thus we have the following result.
This analytically proves the criterion of Miettinen and Cook (1981) obtained inductively. Consider again the example given in Section 3.1. The risk dierences in Table 1 are collapsible over groups of 10 years, while C satis®es Miettinen and Cook's criterion. It can be seen from the example that C is an occasional confounder.
Multiple potential confounders
In this section, we consider the extension of Miettinen and Cook's (1981) criterion to situations with multiple potential confounders. Fisher and Patil (1974) and Greenland and Robins (1986) realized that, if more than one factor is under consideration, Miettinen and Cook's criterion should be applied conditionally on all the other factors. Robins (1997) generalized Miettinen and Cook's criterion under the assumption that a known set of potential confounders is sucient for the control of confounding. Let C be a set of potential confounders, S be a subset of C and R be the remainder subset, i.e. R C\S. Under the assumption that C is sucient for the control of confounding (i.e. D " e c c EjC), Robins (1997) showed that, if R can be decomposed into disjoint subsets R 1 and R 2 such that both
hold, then R can be deleted from the set of potential confounders, i.e. R is not a confounder set. pointed out that Robins's criterion requires both of the above independences simultaneously, but that Miettinen and Cook's criterion only requires one of two analogous independences.
We ®rst give several de®nitions of confounders and irrelevant factors for situations with multiple potential confounders. Then, without Robins's (1997) assumption of a sucient covariate set for the control of confounding, we obtain two conditions for deleting R from the set of potential confounders and potential occasional confounders, one of which is just Robins's criterion.
Let D A be the set of all possible values of the covariate set A, and de®ne the standardization conditional on S s by adjusting the distribution of A in the unexposed population to that in the exposed population as
e, A a, S s) P (A ajE e, S s)X Similarly to the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, we give de®nitions of an irrelevant factor and a confounder for situations with multiple potential confounders. We say that R is a confounder set conditional on S s if
where B s is the confounding bias in the subpopulation S s.
De®nition 5. R is an irrelevant set conditional on S s if
, S s)X
An irrelevant set R is not a confounder set. An adjustment for R, P R (D " e 1|E " e, S s), cannot reduce confounding bias in the subpopulation S s.
We say that R contains at least one occasional confounder conditional on S s if there are both a subset F {F 1 , F F F , F m } of R (i.e. F R) and a partition p k fx k1 , F F F , x kI k g,
e 1jE e, S s) À P Fp (D " e 1jE " e, S s)j`jB s j, where P F p (D " e 1jE " e, S s)
De®nition 6. R is a uniformly irrelevant set conditional on S s if P Fp (D " e 1jE " e, S s) P (D " e 1jE " e, S s)
for any F R and any partition p k of each F k in F.
De®nitions 5 and 6 imply that a uniformly irrelevant set must be an irrelevant set and that a uniformly irrelevant set does not contain any occasional confounders.
Theorem 2. If R can be decomposed into two disjoint subsets R 1 and R 2 such that either (a) R 1 c c EjS s and R 2 c c D " e j(E " e, R 1 , S s)
then R is an irrelevant set conditional on S s and R 1 is a uniformly irrelevant set conditional on S s.
Proof. For a proof of theorem 2 see Appendix B.
Both conditions (a) and (b) of theorem 2 are testable from data. If the set R satis®es either of them, then we can delete R from the set of potential confounders and delete R 1 from the set of occasional confounders. Condition (a) is the same as Robins's (1997) criterion given above. We further show that neither adjustment for a subset of R 1 nor recategorization of some covariates in R 1 can reduce confounding bias.
The following result gives the necessary conditions for R to contain an occasional confounder.
Corollary 2. If R contains at least one occasional confounder conditional on S s, then R T c c EjS s and R T c c D " e j(E " e, S s)X Proof. Suppose that R c c EjS s or R c c D " e j(E " e, S s). From theorem 2 with R 2 [, we know that R R 1 is a uniformly irrelevant set and thus does not contain any occasional confounders conditional on S s.
(
From theorem 2, we can also obtain the following necessary conditions for a confounder set.
Corollary 3. If R is a confounder set conditional on S s, then both
for any possible decomposition R 1 and R 2 of R.
Concluding remarks
The criteria discussed in this paper are mainly concerned with the comparability-based criterion of Miettinen and Cook (1981) , but the de®nitions are general and can be used for both comparability-based and collapsibility-based approaches. Without the untestable assumptions that are necessary for causal inference, confounders cannot be de®nitely determined, but we can eliminate factors which are not confounders from the set of potential confounders. Miettinen and Cook's criterion can be used to identify uniformly irrelevant factors, whereas the collapsibility-based approach only identi®es irrelevant factors, which may also be occasional confounders. The collapsibility-based approach is also commonly employed in epidemiological studies. Miettinen and Cook (1981) and Greenland (1996) showed by counter-example that non-confounding is neither necessary nor sucient for collapsibility of odds ratios or rate ratios. We are working towards a comparison of the comparability-and the collapsibility-based criteria based on risk ratios and risk dierences.
To prove theorem 1, we ®rst show two lemmas.
The proof of this lemma follows from simple manipulation.
Lemma 2. a p 0 for any partition p of D if and only if C c c E or D " e c c CjE " e.
Proof. For the suciency, it is immediately obtained that a p 0 if C c c E or D " e c c CjE " e. For the necessity, let p k {{k}, D\{k}} for any k P D. Rewrite a p k as
For a p k 0, we obtain (a) P(D " e 1jE " e, C P Dn{k}) P(D " e 1jE " e, C k) or (b) P(C kjE " e) P(C kjE e).
We rewrite result (a) as
By denoting it as a/b c/d, this equation is equivalent to (a+c)/(b+d) c/d, i.e.
Thus we obtain that result (a) is equivalent to
x k P (D " e 1jE " e, C k),
Then the equivalent result to (a) or (b) can be rewritten as
If C T c c E, then there exists k 0 P D, such that P(C k 0 jE " e) T P(C k 0 jE e) (i.e. y k0 T 0). Without loss of generality, assume that y 1 T 0; then x 1 x by results (i) and (ii). We prove below that x k x for all k.
When K 2, y 1 T 0 implies that y 2 T 0 for y 1 )y 2 , and thus we obtain from results (i) and (ii) that x 1 x 2 x. When K > 2, assume that x k T x for some k. Then y k 0 by results (i) and (ii). Let p¢ k {{1, k}, D\{1, k}}. Similarly to a p k , we can rewrite
e, C P Dn{1, k})} Â {P (C P {1, k}jE e) À P (C P {1, k}jE " e)}X
Since a p H k 0 and P(C P {1, k}jE e) À P(C P {1, k}jE " e ) y 1 y k y 1 T 0, we obtain that P(D " e 1jE " e, C P Dn{1, k}) P(D " e 1jE " e, C P {1, k}). We have P (D " e 1jE " e, C P Dn{1, k}) iPDn{1, k} P (D " e 1jE " e, C i) P (C ijE " e) iPDn{1, k} P (C ijE " e)
x À iP{1, k} P (D " e 1jE " e, C i) P (C ijE " e)
1 À iP{1, k} P (C ijE " e) x À x 1 z 1 À x k z k 1 À z 1 À z k X where z k P(C kjE " e). Also P (D " e 1jE " e, C P {1, k}) iP{1, k} P (D " e 1jE " e, C i) P (C ijE " e) iP{1, k} P (C ijE " e) x 1 z 1 x k z k z 1 z k X
Thus we obtain
x À x 1 z 1 À x k z k 1 À z 1 À z k x 1 z 1 x k z k z 1 z k X For x 1 x, we can show from this equation that x k x, which contradicts the assumption of x k T x. Thus we have proved that x k x for all k, i.e. D " e c c CjE " e.
A.1. Proof of theorem 1
De®ne B p P(D " e 1|E e) ) P p (D " e 1|E " e). Then we have B p s i1 B xi P (C P x i jE e)X By lemma 1, we obtain B ) B p a p . From the de®nition of a uniformly irrelevant factor, we have that C is a uniformly irrelevant factor if and only if a p 0 for any p. From lemma 2, it is equivalent to (a) C c c E or (b) D " e c c CjE " e.
Appendix B: Proof of theorem 2
We ®rst show that R is an irrelevant set conditional on S s. By the de®nition of standardization, we have P R (D " e 1jE " e, S s) r1PDR 1 r2PDR 2 P (D " e 1jE " e, R 1 r 1 , R 2 r 2 , S s)
Â P (R 2 r 2 jE e, R 1 r 1 , S s) P (R 1 r 1 jE e, S s)X For condition (a), ®rst applying the second conditional independence and then the ®rst, we obtain P R (D " e 1jE " e, S s)
e, R 1 r 1 , S s)
Â P (R 1 r 1 jE e, S s) P (D " e 1jE " e, S s)X Similarly, the suciency of condition (b) can be shown by ®rst applying the ®rst conditional independence and then applying the second. Next we show that R 1 is a uniformly irrelevant set conditional on S s. For condition (a), we have that R 1 c c EjS s implies F c c EjS s for any F R 1 . Thus we obtain P Fp (D " e 1jE " e, S s) x1Pp1 F F F xmPpm P (D " e 1jE " e, F 1 P x 1 , F F F , F m P x m , S s) Â P (F 1 P x 1 , F F F , F m P x m jE " e, S s) P (D " e 1jE " e, S s)X Similarly, the suciency of condition (b) can be obtained since R 1 c c D " e j(E " e, S s) implies F c c D " e j(E " e, S s) for any F R 1 . (
